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Abstract  (EPA), without  considering  the residues  on  food,
What  an  economist  argues  about managing  the  reports  that  many  pesticides  used  in  farming  are
hazards of new production technologies depends on  probable causes of cancer in humans (Committee on
that individual's beliefs about the scientific credibil-  Scientific  and Regulatory Issues; Gladwell).
ity of assessed risk of new technologies, about the  Differences  of view are  not confined  to govern-
meaning  of voluntary risk and compensations,  and  ment  regulators  and  the  constellation  of interest
about the meaning of "progress" and "nature." None  groups they attract.  The scientists-chemical,  bio-
of  these  beliefs  is  derived  from  the  core  of  the  logical, and policy-are also  unsettled.  The litera-
economics discipline. Indeed, the economist's argu-  ture  is  rich  with  reports  seeking  to  establish  a
ments often rest not on economic considerations, but  conceptual  and experimental  basis for defining  the
on these matters of belief that are established outside  hazards, even in the face of the scientific uncertain-
the discipline.  ties.  Not to  be  left  out,  the social  sciences  have
become  intrigued  with  the  question,  "What  is  an
Key words:  agricultural production,  environment,  acceptable  risk?",  but  no consensus  has  emerged,
risk, technological change  either among scientists or policymakers. F  The common theme in all these examples of agri-
rom  the use of antibiotics to animal feed  to the  cultural  hazards  is  the general  concern  about  the
recent debate over Alar, the perceived  or potential  effects on the "natural world" of current and future
health damages of farm chemicals have become the  technology  employed  in production  agriculture.  In
concern of consumers, farmers, and elected officials  turn  I suspect  that the  concerns  about  agricultural
alike. At the same time the possible negative effects  technologies  are  simply  a subset of the  concerns
of farm chemicals on aquatic and terrestrial ecosys-  expressed  about all  technology  and  its perceived
tems  have been  noted.  Drainage  of wetlands  and  hazards-from nuclear power to global warming. In
clearing of forests, which  used to be seen as  land-  this  paper agricultural  illustrations  of this general
scape modifications,  now  are  called threats  to re-  concern are employed. This essay's limited purpose
gional,  national,  and  even  global  ecosystems.  is to review the varied strands of economic argument
Emerging  recombinant  DNA technology-release  about  technological  hazard and relate  these argu-
of "ice minus" bacteria and introduction of the bo-  ments  to current regulation  of technological  haz-
vine growth hormone  "BST," for examples,-have  ard-a philosophy of regulation based upon what I
been caught up in this critical scrutiny,  will term "strong risk aversion."  Because the treat-
A social consensus on the merits of these concerns  ment of the topic is at the broadest level, I recognize
has not been achieved, and the public debate has no  at  the outset  that  I  may  oversimplify  a  complex
near-term  prospect  of resolution.  Public  officials,  problem.
agricultural  interest groups,  environmental groups,
and consumer groups accuse each other of "environ-  ANTICIPATING HARM: THE
mental terrorism" or "short sightedness" as the pub-  REGULATORS' WORLD
lic  debate  is  engaged.  Meanwhile,  differences  of  Consider a proposal to allow field use of a newly
opinion are found within government. For example,  developed pest control chemical on fruit crops.  Ad-
the Food and Drug Administration consistently re-  vocates  for  the  chemical  say  it  will  benefit  fruit
ports that, based on residues in tested food products,  growers  and their  customers  by increasing  yields
pesticides pose no significant risk to health.  At the  and  lowering  prices,  and  there  is  no  evidence  to
same  time  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  establish whether the pesticide is harmful to humans
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11or  the  ecosystem.  Arguments  against  using  the  Page's  statement  establishes  the  conditions  for
chemical are that the benefits are modest, but use of  identifying  "market failure" in defining acceptable
the  pesticide  may  have  devastating  effects  on  risk. First, inadequate hazard information or inabil-
aquatic plant life, and any residues that remain with  ity to interpret hazard information rationalizes gov-
the harvested crop after processing may be carcino-  ernment  responsibility  for  anticipating  harms
genic. However, these adverse effects are admittedly  through  risk assessment.  High  cost of transaction
speculative.  The advocates  for allowing use argue  rationalizes government action, rather than market
that  the remote  and unproven probability of harm  exchange,  defining  acceptable  risk (risk  manage-
make the risk worth the promise of benefits received  ment) through  an ENB  analysis.  After an  optimal
now and in the future.  level of risk is established, price  signals are appro-
Confronted with the arguments, a regulatory body  priately manipulated (taxes, tradable rights, etc.), or
is expected to anticipate  the desirable and undesir-  direct  resource  allocation  decisions  made,  to
able effects of pesticide use and determine whether  achieve the efficient outcomes.
that use should be allowed. Data are collected, inter-  Perfecting  the  ENB  analysis  offers  a  series  of
preted with the best technical theories  and models  interesting intellectual puzzles and is the subject of
available,  and  a decision  is made-yes  or no-to  an extensive research program in the economics of
allow the pesticide's use. A former EPA administra-  risk  management,  including  the  measurement  of
tor describes an ideal two-part decision process on  benefits  and the  measurement  of risk preferences
chemicals this way (Ruckelshaus, p.  1027).  (Smith).  Much of this work has  included applica-
Scientists assess  a risk to find out what the  tions of contingent  valuation  methods and market
problems are. The process of deciding what  wage  and asset value  data to  estimate  damage  to
to doabouttheproblemsisriskmanagement. to do about the problems is risk management.  flora  and  fauna  and  to  value  human  health  and
...In risk management it is assumed that we  morbidity.
have  assessed the health risks of a  suspect  A positive estimate of ENB means that risk gener-
chemical.  We  must then  factor  in benefits,  ators and risk bearers could employ compensation
the costs of various methods  for its control,  payments  to reach  agreement  on  acceptable  risk.
and the statutory  framework for a decision.  However, as Page reminds us, efficient risk markets
.. ~ .,  . .~  . ~  require the voluntary assumption of risk bearing. If
The task of scientific risk assessment is to identify  reire te  o  aumto  o  ari
potential  harms.  Armed with  this  knowledge,  risk  compensation  were  not actually  made, would  risk potential  harms. Armed  with this knowledge,  risk  . . . .
managers can determine  whether the benefits over-  bearing be efficient?  This question is  simply a ver-
managers can determine whether the benefits over-  Kalder-Hicks  potential  compensation
ride potential harms.  sion  of  the  Kalder-Hicks  potential  compensation
conundrum.  However,  because  uncompensated
costs  include  the possibility  of personal  injury  or
THE EXPECTED NET BEONEFITS RULE:  widespread ecosystem  degradation,  there has been
AN ECONOMIC TOUCHSTONE?  a renewed interest in the investigation of alternatives
The economist can  then use the probability  esti-  to  the  potential  compensation  test  (Kneese,  Ben-
mates from the risk assessment to make an expected  David, and Shultze;  Shultze  and Kneese).  A strict
net benefit  calculation  (ENB)  to  answer  the  risk  compensation rule requires actual compensation ei-
management  question,  "Is the risk socially accept-  ther in advance  for risk taking or after-the-fact  for
able?"  The ENB decision rule is the analog of the  injuries incurred  through liability  rules. For exam-
"perfect" risk market, in which individuals informed  ple, Viscusi in a recent paper reviews the efficiency
about risks bargain  until a pareto  efficient level of  of different risk management institutions  (markets
risk  bearing  is  achieved.  Given  unchanging  re-  for advanced compensation  and tort law and social
sources, technology,  preferences,  and distributions  insurance  for  ex  post compensation)  where  effi-
of rights  and low  costs  of  transaction  among  all  ciency is defined in terms of compensation for risk
affected  parties,  compensation  to  risk  bearers  is  bearing.
made through wage differentials in hazardous occu-  ALTERNATIVE DECISION RULES BLEND
pations,  through  discounts  in  asset  and  product  RISK ASSESSMENT  AND  RISK
prices, or through contingent claims markets (insur-  MANAGEMENT
ance). A strong conclusion about socially acceptable  NAEM
risk is drawn from this simplified model. Page notes  Application of the ENB rule requires confidence
that "... for risk markets, whether implicit or explicit,  in a separate risk assessment,  which  quantifies the
to work well enough to define acceptable risk, the  extent and likelihood of harm if the pesticide is used.
nature of the risks  must be understood and the  ac-  However, this scientific assessment often is "soft."
ceptance must be voluntary" (Page, p. 230).  Consider the pesticide example. There  is a limited
12basis  for understanding  the  way the pesticide  will  require  evidence  that it  is  benign.  The  pesticide
interact with the environmental and economic  sys-  would not be  used unless  there is compelling  evi-
tems.  From  the  actual  carcinogenic  effects  to  the  dence that it will do no harm. Requiring the evidence
possible misuse of the pesticide by the farm operator  to show that the pesticide is not harmful before its
to the inability of the food processing and distribu-  use is a risk management decision rule to limit false tion system to remove residues from the crop, there  negative errors, that is, to avoid the error of conclud-
are  many  opportunities  for the pesticide  to cause  ing something is not harmful when it is. The rule to
harm, but as the  system  gets more  complex  it be-  limit false negatives implicitly asserts  that the cost
comes less predictable.  of a false negative is a very high opportunity cost of
Thus, in making the risk-based decision, two mu-  pesticide damage. We are not willing to allow a trial
tually exclusive outcomes must be considered.  One  of the product and accept the possibility that there
is that the environmental  effect of the pesticide will  may be harm. In this approach  even circumstantial
prove  benign  and  that there  will be  only benefits  and indirect evidence of harm is treated as a presup-
realized.  The  alternative  outcome  is that environ-  position of harm, unless proven otherwise. This can
mental and human health costs will far exceed ben-  be termed the "wait and see" approach.  Because we
efits.  This  fundamental  uncertainty  about  the  are  not willing  to allow  a trial  of the  product and
potential for harm  is the  defining  characteristic  of  accept  the  possibility  that  there may  be harm, the
"environmental  hazard" and distinguishes it from a  wait-and-see  decision  rule  is  characterized  as
more  straightforward  risk  management  problem.  "strong risk aversion."
However,  the choice-under-uncertainty  problem  is  Thinking  about the decision process  in terms  of
not foreign  to decision sciences. If we act as Bayes-  degrees of risk aversion blurs the sharp  distinction
ians we simply establish prior subjective probabili-  between risk assessment and risk management. Risk
ties,  gather  new information  to revise  our  priors,  management decision rules specify the way in which
and, when satisfied with the information base, make  evidence  is considered  in the risk assessment  pro-
a decision. However,  even if we think in probabili-  cess. However, by strong risk aversion I do not mean
ties,  it  does  not  follow  that  a  two-part  decision  a zero risk decision rule. The purpose in distinguish-
process,  including  an  ENB  decision  rule,  can  be  ing between strong and weak risk aversion is not to applied in  the case of environmental  hazards.  The  seek an  appropriate  level  of risk,  but rather  is to
recognition  that the probability estimates are "soft"  illustrate  that  the "science"  of risk  assessment  is
suggests that risk management decision variables-  never  divorced from  "judgments"  in risk manage-
the  potential  cost  of  the  risk  assessment  being  ment.
wrong-get  blended  into  the  risk  assessment
process.  ENB AND THE CURRENT  RISK
One approach to the technical uncertainty for harm  MANAGEMENT APPROACH
is to assume  that use of the pesticide  is benign and  Many a frustrated benefit-cost analyst can attest to
to require  evidence  showing that it is harmful.  By  the ineffectiveness of an ENB argument in the mak-
placing the burden on the evidence to show potential  ing of risk management decisions, and even where
for harm,  a risk management  decision  is made  to  one night expect  to find support for ENB analysis
limit false positive errors, that is, to avoid the error  there  is  skepticism.  For  example,  the  editor  of
of concluding something  is harmful  when it is not.  AgrichemicalAgerejects  the call for benefit analysis
Of course the failure to find evidence of harm does  in the pesticide  regulation  process.  He argues that
not guarantee the absence of ill effects.  A decision  we simply need to reach a decision on whether the
rule of limiting false positives implicitly asserts that  risk from  a pesticide  is  "negligible"  and  that  the
the cost of a false positive is a very high opportunity  market will tell us if the product has any benefits.
cost of not using the pesticide; we are willing to use  Benefit analysis is seen as an analytically intractable
the product and accept a possibility that there may  and unnecessary activity (Richardson).
be harm.  However,  a decision  to allow  use is not  Another basis for rejecting the ENB decision rule,
taken  without  consideration  of the  potential  for  whether viewed as a decision heuristic or a call for harm.  Indeed,  there may  be some  element of risk  quantification,  is  that  ENB  looks  to  market  ex-
aversion  in the decision process, but there is a will-  change for defining acceptable social risk. Thus, the ingness to use the pesticide even though a potential  risk management choice is in the hands of members
for occasional harm is recognized. This decision rule  of the society  acting as  self-interested  individuals.
is characterized as "weak risk aversion."  Economists  say  they  recognize  the  limits  of this
An  alternative  approach  to the  technical  uncer-  argument but also argue that the virtue of the ENB
tainty  is to assert  that the pesticide  is harmful  and  rule  is  that  it  makes  a  decision  to  be  inefficient
13explicit  (Freeman  and Portney,  1989  and  1989a).  The  imposition of "involuntary"  risk is deemed
Others  are not convinced that efficiency  should be  unacceptable  as social policy and strong risk aver-
treated as the rebuttable presumption  against which  sion  can  be  defended  by  adopting  the  economic
nonefficiency  arguments must be tested (Sagoff).  argument that risk bearing should be voluntary to be
However,  the most frequent reason  for rejecting  efficient  and equitable.  In  some  special  instances
the ENB approach is the distinction between uncer-  (window washers on skyscrapers), risk markets may
tainty (hazards) and risk. If weknew an action would  be able  to function.  However,  environmental  haz-
be catastrophic, we would not take the action. If we  ards are collective consumption goods (bads?).  As
knew  the  necessary  probabilities  and  appropriate  with any  collective consumption good, high trans-
rules for considering the pros and cons of an action,  action cost (within and across generations) makes it
a more formal two-part risk analysis might be em-  impossible  to  gain  agreement  on  acceptable  risk
ployed.  However,  fundamental  uncertainty  about  bearing  through  exchange.  At the  same  time  the
potential  for  harm  limits  the  applicability  of  the  problems of possible latent and irreversible damage
two-part decision model, instead directing risk man-  are said to limit the applicability of social insurance
agement to the framing of the harm question in terms  or liability law for damage compensation. Thus most
of false positives versus false negatives,  risk bearing  is  likely  to  be  involuntary,  says  this
argument.
At present, the statutory and public expectation is  arguments that it will be easy to e,  that error
tha the appropriate  social  response  is  to  do  all  The arguments that it will be easy to err, that error
that  the  appropriate  social  response  is  to  do  all may  be irreversible,  and that  risk bearing  will be
possible  to anticipate  problems  before they occur,  involuntary  rationalize  a strongly risk-averse  deci-
rather than react  after the harm is done. To "proceed  sion posture. The cost of waiting and more study is
with caution" requires being convinced that there is  said  to  be  small  relative  to  the  irreversible  and
little likelihood of harm before any action is permit-  potentially large costs of a decision based on inade-
ted. While situations vary, the current decision pro-  qte understanding.
quate understanding.
cess  can  be characterized  as strongly  risk averse.
Two related  arguments have been widely accepted  THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCY AND THE
as supporting  this situation:  (1) irreversible and la-  CASE FOR WEAK RISK AVERSION
tent effects and (2) the need for voluntary risk bear- 
ing. Whatis striking is the extent to which arguments  The  sntrponicy  avrsin  critics.
from  the economic  efficiency  framework  underly-  a  t p  y hs  itt  t  s  tti
ing the ENB rule can be, and have been, enlisted to  sksand  natural impulse s:  holdup until
support strong risk aversion. you  learn  far  more. But next  year  we will
The irreversibility  argument is  that if we  deter-  only knowjust a trifle more and if we remain
mine  that a technology  is harmless,  and later dis-  paralyzed,  then  our  inactions  will  merely
cover  that it causes  damage,  the  error  cannot  be  displace  one  risk  with  another  risk.  We
repaired  or rectified.  Human  life  loss  or  loss  of  should continue  to worry about risk assess-
species  are  offered  as  examples  of  irreversible  ments-and learn how  to do these better-
losses. Furthermore,  many  of these irreversible  ef-  but I believe the real improvements,  for the
fects may be "latent,"  taking a long time to manifest  time being, will come in the better manage-
themselves. For this reason also caution  should be  ment of risks.  We need a more experimental
exercised in concluding that the technology will not  societal approach, a  more adaptive ap-
cause harm. Faced with the prospect of irreversible  proach.  We need  to remain loose,flexible and
and  latent  harms,  we  can  argue  that  the  prudent  resilient. (emphasis added) (Raiffa, p. 339).
course is to be skeptical of data showing harmless-  Fo  the  critics  of  strong risk  aversion,  the only
ness and to seek continually more confirmation.  certainty  about a new technology  is that there may
The irreversibility  argument  is not foreign  to an  be a "surprise"-the occurrence of the totally unex-
economic  model  that  associates  "rational"  choice  pected effect (positive or negative), as distinct from
with informed choice. In  fact, the economic model  events that we know will occur with some probabil-
defends  government  regulation  of  environmental  ity but for which we cannot predict a specific occur-
hazards  as a remedy  for the  market's  inability  to  rence  (Wildavsky).  Thus  we might anticipate  that
generate risk information.  To act in government on  planting a  crop  in  a flood  plain  will cause  some
less  than  the best information,  when  the  costs  of  unpredictable,  but  expected,  loss  to  flooding.  In
error are believed to be so high, would be inconsis-  contrast  we were  surprised  to  discover  that DDT
tent with the very economic logic offered for gov-  altered the reproductive success of birds of prey. All
ernment intervention in the first instance.  might agree that use of new technology is accompa-
14nied by possible hazards;  the disagreement  is over  found.  This new  knowledge  is partly  founded  in
how much  we can learn about a technology before  basic research in private and public laboratories, but
its use. The critics of wait-and-see (strong risk aver-  full knowledge of the technologies comes only with
sion)  argue  that  we  just cannot  know  enough  to  their use. Here is the challenge.  Discovering which
identify in advance all beneficial  and adverse con-  technologies  have  a  desirable  balance  cannot  be
sequences of a technology.  anticipated in the laboratory but can only be discov-
However,  the inability to know is  not the central  ered through actual trial, realized error, and effective
point argued by critics of strong risk aversion.  The  feedback to ensure learning.
critics believe that if we determine that a new tech- 
nology  is safe, allow its use, and later discover that  small" and not cumulative. The potential for actua
it causes  damage,  the  error  can  be  corrected  by  "small"  an  d  not cumulative. The potential for actual
repairing  the  damagee  or r  cn  ecth  gifygri  tt  he  harmta  Thic  errors  is repairing  the damage or rectifying the harm.  This  said to be reduced if there is an increase in diversity ability  to rectify a harm  is the resiliency Raiffa is  of trials. Diversity means encouraging many exper- of trials. Diversity means encouraging many exper- advocating. "Resilience  is the capacity to cope with  imental technologies,  not  limiting technologies  to
unanticipated dangers after they have become man-  only those we think are  safe.particular concern
ifest,  learning  to  bounce  back"  (p.  77),  says  o  th  wethinkare  safe." Aparticularconcern ifest,  learning  to  bounce  back  (p.  77),  says  about  the  strongly  risk averse position  is  that be- Wildavsky.  A confidence in resilience will mitigate  cause  it limits  trials  it  increases  the  potential  for
against strong risk aversion,  not because risks are  harm. The following reflection  on sweeteners ade-
taken without consideration of  possible adverse con-  quately conveys the basic argument that, over time
sequences, but because a belief in resiliency instills  safety comes from diversity:
a  confidence  to  proceed  with  a  new  technology
while the potential for harm is not fully determined.  Everyone is aware of the attacks on sugar and
Belief in resiliency does not speak  against conser-  sugar  substitutes, such as  saccharin and cy-
vatism  in risk  taking,  but it does  speak  against  a  clamates,  as  harmful  for our  health.  Enter
reactionary position in which any possibility of error  fructose,  a sugar  found  in fruit  and honey,
or harm can halt all change (Wildavsky).  touted as a natural and therefore wholesome
Advocates of resiliency argue that trying to antic-  sweetener.  ... Now, "new research  indicates
ipate all hazards is not only impossible, but is coun-  that  high levels  of fructose  exacerbate  the
terproductive to the goal of increasing safety. Safety  effects of copper deficiency, a factor that has
means increasing  human health  and longevity  and  already  been  linked  to  coronary  problems,
managing  the  natural  environment  toward  the  including  high  cholesterol  levels."  Given
achievement  of human purposes.  For advocates of  that "Nature sometimes seems to have a ma-
resiliency, strong risk aversion  inhibits technologi-  licious  sense  of  humor,"  I  do  not  expect
cal "progress"  and technological progress  is essen-  anyone  to have known of this indirect con-
tial  to  achieving  a  safer  society.  In  Wildavsky's  nection,  but  I  do  think  that if matters  had
phrase "wealthier is healthier," he rejects the balanc-  been  allowed to run their course, it is likely
ing metaphor used in the current regulatory debate  tha  a  variety  of sweeteners  would  have  a
(and the core of the argument for an ENB decision  share of the market so that very large popu-
rule), in which material wealth is sacrificed to gain  lations  would  not  be  subject  to  the  un-
health (reduced hazard). Health comes with wealth,  anticipated consequences  of the few that, for
not at the  expense  of wealth  (Simon),  and wealth  the moment, are favored (Wildavsky, p. 86).
comes from technological  change.  Thus a resilient  A belief  in resiliency  will  encourage  weak  risk
society is defined as one of increasing  wealth  and  aversion  in the consideration  of technological  haz-
health,  driven  by  technological  change.  However,  ards and the allowance of trials of technology with-
each  new  technology  brings both benefits  and po-  out absolute assurance  that there will be no harm.
tential hazards, in joint supply. Thus, the benefits of  Examples from agriculture  can be imagined. Resil-
technological  change are  inseparable from  techno-  iency means diversification of cropping practices to
logical hazards that may arise.  limit  the geographic  scope of errors  that do arise;
Advocates  of resiliency argue  that  the ability to  monoculture over large geographic expanses may be
detect and react to technological  hazards  is rooted  the enemy of resiliency.  A resilient agriculture will
in the continuous  creation  of new knowledge.  For  use multiple pest control  strategies,  including  per-
agricultural  production  new  knowledge  requires  haps more varieties of chemicals in order to reduce
biotechnology  and  chemical  research  capacity  to  the problems of pest resistance that can be a function
develop  rapidly and  continuously  alternative  pest  of limiting allowable chemicals and increasing dos-
control approaches as hazards of old approaches are  age of what we do use (Gianessi and Puffer).
15RESILIENCY:  THE ECONOMIC  of technical change  as a vast and prolonged
TOUCHSTONE?  process of learning about the environment in
Economists  could be comfortable with  the resil-  which we operate is in any way a far-fetched
analogy... there are sharp differences of opin- iency  argument.  Resiliency is analogous  to a con-  analoy... therearesharpdifferencesofopn-
ception  of the market as an engine of evolutionary  o 
empirical  generalization  is so  clear that all change.  The evolutionary perspective requires that  emp  al generalization  is so  clear that all
the economist depart from a model of markets that  schools  of thought must accept it, although
pres  s  full knowledge and unchanging resources,  they interpret it in different fashions: Learn- presumes full knowledge and unchanging resources, p~resumes  ' ing  is  the product  of experience.  Learning technology,  and  preferences.  Instead  knowledge  t  pc  exerene. Learn
can  only  take  place  by  trying  to  solve  a grows with time and with changing technology and 
problem  ....A second generalization that can preferences. The market economy, for the Austrians,  problem....secondgeneralizationthatcan
be gleaned  ... is that to have steadily increas- or the larger cultural  system including markets,  for  e gee  .. i  t  hae steadily increas-
the  institutionalists,  is  the  social  search  system  ig  perormnce  ... the  stimulus  situations
where we collectively explore the future of what we  themselves  must be steadily evolving rather
than merely repeating...  (Arrow). can achieve (technology) and what we desire ,(pref-  (Arrow). can . achi . (  y  ad wat  we  How does the market fit into this search for prog- erences)  in a trial and error process (Hamilton).  the  t  - ress  and  the  achievement  of  safety?  The  market
Search, at least partly  through markets, results in  model can be cited, not for its static allocative prop-
coevolution  of  humans  with  nature  (Boulding;  erties,butratherforthewaythepricesystemcreates
Norgaard).  In coevolution human modifications are  needed incentives for discovery and application of
made  to  nature  and  humans  in  turn  remake  our  new technology  (Mowery andosenberg).  How do
preferences  for the  state of the  natural  world as  it  weensurethatmarketrisktakingisconservativeand
changes  in  response  to  human  intervention.  This  not "radical"?  One argument  is that a competitive
coevolutionary  process characterizes "human  prog-  world is not homogeneous, and resiliency is secured
ress."  The evidence  of human  history is that while  because  failure in  one part of the  economy  is not
there has been no discernible evolution of the human  failure for the whole economy. Thus, it may be the
organism, human modifications  and manipulations  public  policies  toward  agriculture  that  give  us
of the  environment-agriculture,  medicine,  water  monocultureandagriculturalsystemsdependenton
control structures, and the like-made us richer and  a limited number of chemicals. A more market-ori-
healthier.  We  have  made  our  environment  serve  ented agricultural economy might be more resilient
human  ends  as  much  as  we  have  adapted  to our  and less likely to become an environmental  hazard.
environment. However, there is more to the defense of markets
In the evolutionary view technological progress is  than that if atomistic they can spread risk. Because
discovered, not planned, because no amount of prior  a market does not operate  outside  a legal context,
investigation  will yield "perfect" information  about  basic  concepts of liability  law  are required  as  ad-
alternative courses of action.  juncts to the search process.  In order to appreciate
The problem in economic life is not calculat-  how liability  law  might be structured, we  need to
ing  what  to do  after knowing  all  that you  recall the distinction between surprise and expected
need to know. The problem is to know.... The  harms. Expected harm is risk, and surprise is hazard.
Austrians  see  the economy  with  the  meta-  Liability law  is first about requiring compensation
phor of fog, the fog in which we maximize  for expected harms. If harm were foreseeable (if not
what  the  neoclassicals  so  confidently  de-  predictable with precision), the user of the technol-
scribe  as  "objective  functions"...  the  main  ogy would be obligated to compensate for the harms
problem is acquiring knowledge, not exploit-  when  they occur.  To ensure that this compensation
ing it (Klamer and McCloskey, p.  10).  is possible,  the user must either self insure or pur-
Once  the  information  assumption  of  the  static  chase insurance. The cost of insurance is an incen-
economic  model is cast aside, the question of how  tive to make investments (1) to reduce the potential
knowledge  is acquired  and grows is answered in a  for harm (given relative costs), (2) to search out new
remarkably  consistent  manner  across  the  various  and less potentially harmful technologies, and (3) to
schools  in the  discipline.  Simply  put, new knowl-  develop  information  on  the actuarial  risks of  any
edge, acquired from trial and error experimentation,  technology. In this way the market searches for not
motivates technical change.  only new technologies  but also  safer  technologies
Knowledge has to be acquired ... The acqui-  (Bardach and Kagan; Katzman).
sition of knowledge is what is usually termed  The evolutionary perspective dismisses the possi-
"learning"  ... I  do not think that the picture  bility of knowing before acting, presumes that errors
16will be made and corrected in the development  and  risk and then argues for the desirability of strong risk
application of technology, and sees technical change  aversion.
as the defining feature of human progress. An evo-  Risk assessment is a culturally dependent process.
lutionary economics perspective can be used to sup-  In  a fascinating  case  study,  anthropologist  Shelia
port  the  resiliency  argument  and  the  weak  risk  Jasanoff reports that, using the same data, U.S. and
aversion  decision  rule for allowing  new technolo-  British  scientists reached entirely  different conclu-
gies. The design of optimal rules for the application  sions about the hazards of asbestos, formaldehyde,
of markets  for defining "acceptable"  technological  airborne  lead, and 2,4,5 -T.  She concludes
change can be a matter for debate, but there is a case  ... acceptance  or rejection of particular stud-
to be made for the use of markets as search institu-  ies, the development  of evaluation  criteria,
tions.  the decision to wait for more evidence or to
IS THERE  A  CASE  OR  EAK RISK  commission  new studies  are  all colored  by
S THRE  A  AS FOR  A  RS  varying degrees of risk averseness in differ-
AVERSION?  ent countries. Scientists, no less than policy-
Advocates of strong risk aversion make their case  makers  or the general  public,  share in  the
by arguing that we should know before acting, avoid  prevailing national attitudes toward risk, and
involuntary  risk  bearing,  and  avoid  irreversible  these  values  are  reflected  in  the  way they
harms.  However,  if we acknowledge  the resiliency  filter and organize scientific knowledge.
argument,  this rhetoric of strong risk aversion war-  The rhetoric about awaiting the scientific purity of
rants critical examination.  the risk assessment process is misleading (Wynne).
IS RISK  ASSESSMENT  SC  ?  There  is a tendency  to strong risk aversion among IS RISK ASSESSMENT  SCIENCE?  technical risk assessors, blurring the distinction  be-
Advocates of strong risk aversion want to wait for  tween  risk management  and risk assessment.  The
an  improved  scientific  understanding  of  a  arguments  used  to justify  strong risk aversion  are
technology's potential for harm before permitting its  familiar  ones:  avoiding  imposition  of  voluntary
use. However, improving  a risk assessment is not a  harm  and  avoiding  irreversibility.  So  we need  to
simple matter of spending more time and analyzing  examine these arguments once more.
more data, because our "models of harm" are poorly
developed.  At some point in the risk assessment  the  IS POSSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY  RISK
damaging properties must be "guessed at." The rules  A MEANINGFUL POLICY GUIDE?
for making  the guesses  are  what has  been  termed  Strong risk aversion is defended as a decision rule
"science policy," that is, the "science" of risk assess-  to  avoid  imposing  involuntary  (uncompensated)
ment  includes  risk management  judgments  (Ricci  risk. For advocates of weak risk aversion,  the inte-
and Molton).  gration of existing liability law for health risk (Abra-
There is evidence that "science policy" is strongly  ham),  the  newer  concept  of  the  "environmental
risk averse in the  United States. Rather than using  bond"  for  damages  to natural  environments  (Per-
"best guesses"  at points of poor  understanding,  a  rings),  and concepts of social insurance  (Abraham
decision is often made to use "worst cases," and the  and Merrill; Viscusi) can allow newer technologies
"cascading"  of  worst  cases  can  substantially  in-  to be employed  with  the promise  of compensation
crease estimates  of harm.  Defenders  of the current  for the harms that may arise.
approach  are  unambiguous  in  their defense.  One  However,  if one defines  harms  as "irreversible"
defender (Finkel, 1989 and 1989a)  of this approach  then  the  insurance  alternative  for  compensation
states:  would be rejected because the very concept of irre-
Although conservative  estimates have been  versible  harm  makes  compensation  meaningless.
widely described as policy choices masquer-  Thus, when harms do arise there has been a tendency
ading  as scientific  facts,  central or average  in the court system to make liability damage awards
estimates  themselves  embody  subtle  value  that exceed measured damages and to include puni-
judgments regarding the implicit social costs  tive  penalties  for presumably  irresponsible  social
of erring  on  the high  or low  sides. In this  behavior by the users of the technology.  Also, ben-
respect, best estimates are no  better than  efits and risk exist jointly in any  technology;  there
conservative ones, which simply strike the  will be surprises, effects  the user of the technology
balance infavor of caution about underesti-  could not have "reasonably"  expected.  Should  the
mation. (emphasis added) (Finkel, 1989).  harms from surprise outcomes be compensated, and
This statement affirms the fact that risk assessment  by whom? Increasingly our society  has determined
is not separate  from social judgment  on acceptable  that all harms must be compensated  by  the user of
17the  technology.  This  is  the "strict  liability  rule,"  typically  the case-and  perhaps  is always
which is increasingly  imposed on the users of farm  the case-there are still other solutions that
chemicals (Batie).  bring  substantial  advantages  to  large num-
The defense  offered for punitive damage awards  bers  of  persons  and  these  advantages  are
and strict liability is the undesirability of involuntary  worth seeking even at loss to other persons-
risk bearing,  but the  result of strict liability, com-  for example, protecting civil liberties of mi-
bined with punitive damage awards, is the weaken-  norities even if doing so is greatly  irritating
ing  of insurance  markets  as  costs of future claims  and  obstructive  to  others-then  there  re-
become  unpredictable  for  the  insuring  agents.  mains a conflict as to what is to be done. The
Meanwhile, outside the courts, in political discourse  pareto efficient solution is not necessarily the
and in  regulatory  hearings,  demands  are  made to  best choice.
limit "involuntary risk bearing" (Hiskes; Kennedy).  The strict attention to compensation for risk bear-
For the  advocates  of resiliency,  the emphasis on  ing  discourages  technological  change.  Many  au-
limiting  involuntary  risk bearing  slows  the search  thors recognize the trade off between certain and full
for and development of technology that can increase  compensation for individual harms and technologi-
human welfare. These critics of strong risk aversion  cal changes that benefit the larger group. The proper
remind us that potential hazards coexist with bene-  trade off is not definable, but institutional reforms to
fits in all technologies, existing and new. However,  permit weak risk aversion in allowing new technol-
as a society we often reject the new technology and  ogies  can  be made  (Abraham  and  Merrill;  Abra-
implicitly  accept  the hazards  of  the  old (Huber).  ham).  Of  course,  what  individual  economists
Examples  are the decision  to produce  power with  believe about the appropriate trade off between the
coal and accept its hazards  while rejecting nuclear  individual compensation and "progress" in the soci-
power or decisions to deny a new pest control chem-  ety at large is not derivable from the rules within the
ical  while  allowing  old  ones  to  remain  in  use  discipline.
(Gianessi).  Of course, the  hazards  of the old  tech-
nologies  may  be "irreversible"  and "involuntarily  PRO  A MANI  UL CO
borne" by some segment of the population. In effect  To suggest that harms  are irreversible carries  un-
it is not  possible  to separate  hazards  from  use  of  stated premises, including:  new technology may not
technology,  and, as such, all technologies  have the  be progressive,  technology  is the enemy of the nat-
potential  to impose harms  that will be uncompen-  ural world, and preferences for the natural world are
sated.  unchanging.  To  reject  the  idea  of  irreversibility,
A  second  criticism of the  involuntary  risk argu-  arguing that we can be resilient, is to assert faith in
ment  is  that  to  deny  new  technology  is  to  deny  technological progress and to see the natural world
potential gains  to those  who might be made better  as  a  human  creation.  Technological  advance  has
off. These lost opportunities for improved health are  shaped  the culture  of the  20th century,  and as  we
a cost that must be considered. If human well-being  approach the next century the historians of technol-
is the  goal, then to disallow a technology  that  can  ogy are noting radically increased  societal expecta-
increase  food production or lower food prices is to  tions  of  what  technology  can  achieve.  This
reduce nutritional levels and increase health risk in  expectation runs the gamut from biological technol-
the  population  at large  (Brosten  and Simmonds).  ogy to information technology  and the integration
There is a greater risk from poor nutrition than there  of the two. In this process of change, nature will be
is from residual chemicals on the foods themselves  modified by human technology, but will the natural
or from the  biotechnology.  In this regard the very  world collapse?  Will nature be different or deadly?
concept  of the  pareto  test and  involuntary  risk is  Ecologist Renee Dubos says,
questioned.  Consider  a  technology  that  radically  It  is  not  true  that  nature  knows  best...  By
increases  food production and health in a poor na-  using reason and knowledge, we can manip-
tion  but might result in occasional  deaths from  its  ulate the raw stuff of nature and shape it into
use. The pareto rule strictly applied  would not per-  ecosystems that have qualities  not found in
mit the use of that technology,  yet the failure to use  wilderness.  Many  potentialities  become
it imposes  involuntary harms on a large segment of  manifest only when they have been brought
the population.  Charles Lindbloom argues that  out by human imagination and toil (p. 461).
Economists  often  blunder  into  the  conclu-  Such technological optimism is not without skep-
sion that policymakers should choose pareto  tics. They ask if today's technology  is different in
efficient  solutions because  they  help  some  kind from the past (Costanza). For them, the past is
persons  and hurt no others. Not  so. If, as is  not prologue, since we have the capacity to modify
18large  populations  and  ecosystems  on  an intercon-  summarize by example,  whether DDT was consid-
nected world  scale. On this basis some economists  ered a hazard  was determined  by  society's prefer-
might argue that using chemicals or biotechnology  ences  to preserve populations  of birds of prey. The
in agriculture  risks causing  unacceptable  and irre-  fact  that  DDT may  still be  used elsewhere  in  the
versible harms. However,  neither technological op-  world is a matter of different preferences, not differ-
timism  nor pessimism  is derivable from economic  ent effects of the DDT. Damage is a social concept
inquiry but rather must be based on accepting "sci-  as well as abiological and physical one. Economists'
entific" judgments made outside the discipline.  personal  views  on  the  meaning  of progress  must
However,  there  is more  to the  skepticism  about  enter their professional arguments.
technological  "progress."  Advocates  of resiliency
and weak risk aversion are willing to experiment in  ECONOMICS IN THE HAZARDS  DEBATE:
the  natural world  because  the  natural  world  has  a  A SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
different meaning  to them than to the strongly risk
averse.  To the strongly risk averse,  tampering with  producon  technlgie  the  nite  State  of  nlt
the "natural  order"  is  simply wrong.  In his article  production  technologies  the United  States  of the the  "natural  order"  is  simply wrong.  In his article  1990s is a strongly risk-averse  society. We insist on "The  End of Nature,"  McKibben  argues  that  "an  1990s  i  a strongly rsk-averse society. We insist on "The  End  of Nature,"  McKibben  argues  that  "an  anticipating  and  regulating  all  potential  harms  in idea can become extinct, just like an animal or plant.  a  an  and  elti  ll  oen  ha 
The idea in  this case  is nature-the wild province  advance  and have  limited  confidence  that  we can
apart from man, under whose rules he was born and  recover-be resilientif harms are realized. Citing
died"  (p. 70). What may be at stake is the end of an  arguments  such  as  irreversibility  and  involuntary idea;  the idea that humans and nature  are separate.  risk bearing, this anticipatory policy net catches and idea;  the idea that humans and nature are separate.  holds  back emerging agricultural  production  tech-
McKibben  goes  on  to  reflect  on  the  promise  of  holds  back emerging agricultural  production  tech-
biotechnology  to  ensure  increases  in  agricultural  Much economic argument from the main-
productivity and concludes,  line  economic  research  program,  which  stresses
The problem is that nature, the int  "market failure," can be enlisted in support of strong The problem is that nature, the independent  risk aversion.
force that has surrounded us since our earli-
est days, cannot  coexist  with our  numbers  Some  reject the  anticipatory  view  and argue  for
and our habits. We may well be able to create  resiliency in our approach  to employing new  tech-
a world that can support our inhabitants but  nologies. Advocates  of resiliency find the anticipa-
it will be an artificial world-a space station  tory approach  to be antithetical  to the stated goal of
(p.  100).  increasing  "safety"-i.e.,  human  welfare.  These
It is the threat of technological change to the idea  people tend to be technological optimists who asso-
of the natural world that often motivates the strongly  ciate  technological  change  with  human  progress.
risk averse. The argument that technology allows us  They advocate  a cautious trial-and-error  investiga-
to maintain  and increase human welfare  over time  tion  of new  technologies  as  the  path to increased
assumes we can learn what we like based on what-  safety  in  our  society.  Much  of evolutionary  eco-
ever  environment we have, and that troubles some  nomic thinking can be enlisted to support the resil-
people.  Philosopher Mark Sagoff notes  that,  "Our  iency  argument.  Indeed,  the  market  itself can  be
decisions about the environment will also determine  defended  as an effective means to increasing safety.
... what future people are like and what their tastes  What  an  economist  argues  about  managing  the
and preferences will be..." (p. 63). Then, after spec-  hazards of new production technologies depends on
ulating on a future in which humans totally reshape  that individual's beliefs about the scientific credibil-
the natural  world-pejoratively  a world of plastic  ity of assessed risk of new technologies,  about the
trees  and  barren,  but productive,  landscapes-he  meaning of voluntary risk and compensations,  and
concludes that, "Future generations might not com-  about the meaning of "progress" and "nature." None
plain; a pack of yahoos will like a junkyard environ-  of  these  beliefs  is  derived  from  the  core  of  the
ment.  This  is  the problem.  That kind  of future  is  economics  discipline. Indeed the economist's argu-
efficient.  It may well be equitable. But it is tragic all  ments often rest not on economic considerations but
the same" (p. 63).  on these matters of belief that are established outside
Thus technological hazards often are defined as a  the discipline.
product  of  both  technology  and  preferences.  To
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